Abstract. It has been considered most important and difficult to analyze the bias and find a large bias regarding the security of cryptosystems, since the invention of linear cryptanalysis. The demonstration of a large bias will usually imply that the target crypto-system is not strong. Regarding the bias analysis, researchers often focus on a theoretical solution for a specific problem. In this paper, we take a first step towards the synthetic approach on bias analysis. We successfully apply our synthetic analysis to improve the most recent linear attacks on CubeHash and Rabbit respectively. CubeHash was selected to the second round of SHA-3 competition. For CubeHash, the best linear attack on 11-round CubeHash with 2 470 queries was proposed previously. We present an improved attack for 11-round CubeHash with complexity 2 414.2 . Based on our 11-round attack, we give a new linear attack for 12-round CubeHash with complexity 2 513 , which is sharply close to the security parameter 2 512 of CubeHash. Rabbit is a stream cipher among the finalists of ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project (eSTREAM). For Rabbit, the best linear attack with complexity 2 141 was recently presented. Our synthetic bias analysis yields the improved attack with complexity 2 136 . Moreover, it seems that our results might be further improved, according to our ongoing computations.
Introduction
It has been considered most important and difficult to analyze the bias and find a large bias regarding the security of crypto-systems, since the invention of linear cryptanalysis [6] almost 20 years ago. The demonstration of a large bias will usually imply that the target crypto-system is not as strong as expected. Regarding the bias analysis, researchers often focus on a theoretical solution for a specific problem. Unfortunately, it does not help much to analyze the bias for a broad class of problems.
Most often, we need to study the combined bias of multiple Boolean functions (such as multiple linear approximations) with many input variables. Assuming that these Boolean functions are all independent pairwise, the problem reduces to the bias computation of each Boolean function separately. Apparently, if the terms involved in each Boolean function are statistically independent of the terms in the others, we are sure that all are independent pairwise and it is "safe" to concentrate on bias computation of each Boolean function. Further, it is worth pointing out that it is incorrect to conclude independence when the terms involved in each function "differ" from the terms occurring in the others. It is thus essential to conduct synthetic analysis to study these bias problems. In this paper, we take a first step towards the synthetic approach on bias analysis. We also propose a conditional dependent bias problem and we give an analysis to estimate the bias.
We apply our synthetic analysis to improve the most recent linear attack [1] on the hash function CubeHash [2] . CubeHash was selected to the second round of SHA-3 competition [8] . In [1] , based on the bias analysis for 11-round CubeHash, the best linear attack on 11-round CubeHash with 2 470 queries was proposed. Our results improve the bias analysis [1] . We show the largest bias 2 −207.1 for 11-round CubeHash, and we present an improved linear attack for 11-round CubeHash with complexity 2 414.2 . Further, based on our 11-round attack, we give a new linear attack for 12-round CubeHash with complexity 2 513 , which is sharply close to the security parameter 2 512 of CubeHash.
Meanwhile, our synthetic analysis is applied to the recent linear attack [5] on stream cipher Rabbit [3] . Rabbit is a stream cipher among the finalists of ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project (eSTREAM). It has also been published as informational RFC 4503 with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). In [5] , the best linear attack with complexity 2 141 was presented. As reference, Rabbit designers claim the security level 2 128 . Our synthetic analysis applies to the main part of the bias analysis [5] . Our results yield the improved linear attack with complexity 2 136 .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give preliminary analysis on CubeHash. In Section 3, we introduce the synthetic approach to the bias analysis problem and discuss how to apply to CubeHash round function in details. In Section 4, we propose the synthetic bias analysis for the conditional dependent problem. In Section 5 and Section 6, we present our improved attacks on CubeHash and Rabbit. We conclude in Section 7.
Preliminary Analysis on CubeHash Round Function
The hash function CubeHash [2] was designed by Prof. Daniel J. Bernstein. It was one of the 14 candidates which were selected to the second round of SHA-3 competition [8] . SHA-3 was initiated by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology to push forwards the development of a new hash standard, following the recent fruitful research work on the hash function cryptanalysis. CubeHash is a family of cryptographic hash functions, parameterized by the performance and security requirement. At the heart of it, CubeHash consists of an internal state of 1024 bits, round transformation T , round number r, between introduction of new message blocks. At the end, T is repeated 10r times before outputting h bits of its state as the final hash value. Security/performance tradeoffs are provided with different combinations h, r and the message block length b. The normal security parameters are r = 16, b = 32, according to [1] .
Each Round of CubeHash consists of two half rounds. Each half round consists of five steps, and only one step out of five introduces nonlinearity to the internal state by performing the modular addition operations. We will investigate the largest bias [1] for CubeHash. It was shown that due to this largest bias, a non-trivial linear attack on 11-round CubeHash with 2 470 queries exists. As reference, the security parameter is 2 512 . We will improve the bias analysis of multiple linear approximations in [1] . Recall that the bias 4 of a binary random variable X is Pr[X = 0] − Pr[X = 1]. Our main focus is that, within each round, the linear approximations are not all independent pairwise. This can be justified by the fact that nonlinearity is introduced by two separate steps (Step 1 and Step 6) instead of one step within a round.
Let us start from a simple case of Round 7 first. We let 32 words x 00000 , x 00001 , . . . , x 11111 to denote the internal states of 1024 bits (each word has 32 bits). The round transformation T can be described by the following ten steps of operations ('+' denotes modular addition):
Step 1: x 0n + x 1n → x 1n for all 4-bit n
Step 2: x 0n ≪ 7 → x 0n for all 4-bit n
Step 3: x 00n ↔ x 01n for all 3-bit n
Step 4: x 0n ⊕ x 1n → x 0n for all 4-bit n
Step 5: x 1jk0m ↔ x 1jk1m for all 1-bit j, k, m
Step 6: x 0n + x 1n → x 1n for all 4-bit n
Step 7: x 0n ≪ 11 → x 0n for all 4-bit n
Step 8: x 0j0km ↔ x 0j1km for all 1-bit j, k, m
Step 9: x 0n ⊕ x 1n → x 0n for all 4-bit n
Step 10:
For our purpose, we use superscripts to represent the step number within the round. We let the states without superscripts to represent the states right at beginning of the round. The round number of the internal states which we study is clear from the context, and we omit it from the notations. At Step 1 of Round 7, the step operation allows us to deduce:
We note that two linear approximations are introduced into (4):
We continue on (4) from Step 2 through
Step 5:
At Step 6, (7) can be rewritten as,
Four linear approximations are introduced in this step:
0x18000 · x equals the combined bias of the six approximations (5), (6) , (8), (9), (10), (11) holding simultaneously. Furthermore, if these approximations are independent, we apply Piling-up lemma [6] to deduce that the total bias is equal to the product of the six individual biases for each linear approximation. Unfortunately, as we demonstrate below, this independence assumption is not true.
Obviously, we can easily justify that Approximations (5), (6) are independent, because the involved states x 10100 , x 00100 in (5) are independent of the involved states x 10110 , x 00110 in (6); similarly, Approximations (8), (9) , (10), (11) are independent pairwise. Our main focus here is to show below that these two groups of approximations are, however, not independent. The internal states are invertible with the CubeHash round function T , as each step operation is invertible. Thus, we can rewrite Approximations (8), (9) , (10), (11) in terms of states right after step one as follows respectively,
In the next section, we will discuss the synthetic bias analysis and apply it for CubeHash Round 7 to analyze (5), (6) , (13), (14), (15) and (16). dividing originally one (big) group of a larger number of functions into multiple independent groups; once grouping is done, we just need to study each group of smaller size individually. This helps make the task of bias analysis easier by reducing the number of the functions, which have to be studied simultaneously. We will explain in details next on CubeHash.
Our Analysis on CubeHash Round Function
We will first see how to group the six approximations (5), (6) , (13), (14), (15) and (16) for CubeHash Round 7. We look at (13) and (14) first. At first glance, it seems that they are dependent as both have x 1 10110 and x 1 10100 . However, we note that x 1 01110 , x 1 01100 only occurs once in (5), (6), (13), (14), (15), (16), i.e., neither occurs in (5), (6), (15)
10110 , x 1 01100 ≪ 7 ⊕ x 1 10100 . Consequently, we know that (13) and (14) are independent. As x 1 10100 occurs in both (5) and (13), we group (5) and (13) together. Likewise, as x 1 10110 occurs in both (6) and (14), we group (6) and (14) together.
Both (15), (16) involve x 1 11110 , x 1 11100 , and it thus seems that (15), (16) are dependent. We can use the fact that x 1 00100 , x 1 00110 are independent to show that x 1 11110 , x 1 00100 ≪ 7⊕x 1 11100 are independent of x 1 11100 , x 1 00110 ≪ 7 ⊕ x 1 11110 . So, we deduce (15) and (16) are independent. As (15), (16) relates to x 1 00100 , x 1 00110 respectively, x 1 00100 is related to (5), (13), and x 1 00110 is related to (6) and (14). Therefore, we are able to make two groups. Group One contains (5), (13), (15). Group Two contains (6), (14), (16). These two groups are independent as we have just explained above.
When it comes to the joint bias computation of a group of dependent linear approximations, in general, it is a computationally hard problem, although in certain cases it might be feasible to calculate the bias for a single linear approximation. For example, [4] is applicable to analyze the bias of a single linear approximation in our above CubeHash problem. Nevertheless, when the bias is large, we can always compute it empirically, as successfully showed with recent results on RC4 biases (eg. [9] ). The direct bias computation when the bias is small is beyond the scope of this paper.
Our computations show that the joint bias for the group of approximations (5), (13), (15) holding simultaneously is around 2 −2.5 and the joint bias for (6), (14), (16) is around 2 −2.5 .
Consequently, the total bias for the linear approximation (12) at Round 7, is calculated as 2 −2.5 × 2 −2.5 = 2 −5 . In contrast, if the dependency within the round is ignored, we would have a smaller bias 2 −6 at Round 7.
For CubeHash Round 8, we can show that six pairwise independent approximations arise at Step 1:
Eight pairwise independent approximations arise at Step 6. They are presented in terms of states right after step one of the round:
Thus, we have 6+8=14 linear approximations involved in this round. As was done for Round 7, we can demonstrate that these 14 approximations fall into four independent groups.
Group One: (17), (18), (23), (24), (28), (30). Group Two: (19), (20), (21), (22), (25), (26). Group Three: (27). Group Four: (29).
As Group Three and Group Four each contains only one approximation, we easily know the bias is 2 −1 for each group directly from [4] . Group One and Group Two each contains six approximations. We compute the total bias for each group separately. Our results show that the bias for Group One is 2 −5 and the bias for Group Two is 2 −6.8 . Note that the independence assumption would yield a smaller bias 2 −6 , 2 −8 for Group One, Group Two respectively. Consequently, we deduce the total bias 2 −5 × 2 −6.8 × 2 −1 × 2 −1 = 2 −13.8 for Round 8, by considering the dependence within the round. Note that, if the dependency within the round is ignored, we would have a smaller bias 2 −16 .
Synthetic Bias Analysis on the Conditional Dependent Problem
When analyzing CubeHash round function, we note a new bias problem, which we shall call conditional dependence from now on. This is in contrast to the well-known concept of conditional independence in statistics. Let X, Y, Z be random variables. Recall that X, Y are conditional independent given Z, if X, Y, Z satisfy Pr(X = x, Y = y|Z) = Pr(X = x|Z) Pr(Y = y|Z) for all x, y. In our problem, X, Y are statistically independent variables, but X, Z are dependent as well as Y, Z. We say that X, Y are conditional dependent given Z. We are concerned with the bias of f 1 (X)⊕f 2 (Y )⊕f 3 (Z) for Boolean functions f 1 , f 2 , f 3 . For convenience, we say f 1 (X), f 2 (Y ) are conditional dependent given f 3 (Z) rather than that X, Y are conditional dependent given Z. Formally speaking, we consider that u 0 , u 1 , u 2 , v 1 , v 2 are independent variables of binary strings (of fixed length). Three Boolean functions v 1 ) are defined over those variables. For simplicity, they are denoted by A, B, C in shorthand. We assume that we already know the bias for A, B, C respectively. The main question is, we want to estimate the bias for A ⊕ B ⊕ C, and due to the dependence we do not want to use the Piling-up approximation. We assume it infeasible to compute directly. Our first solution is to obtain the bias for A ⊕ C (or A ⊕ B) first. Then, estimate the bias for A ⊕ B ⊕ C by taking either of the two Bias(A ⊕ C) · Bias(B), Bias(A ⊕ B) · Bias(C).
Here, we consider only one dependence relation and ignore another dependence relation. By considering the functions as black-boxes (of random functions), we propose to use the heuristics and make a more delicate estimate as follows. As u 1 affects both A ⊕ B and C, we make a simple assumption about the two distributions of the bias for A ⊕ B and for C over u 1 : the absolute value of the bias is (almost) a constant and can only take values in a set of two elements. Thus, it leads us to compute the average p + (resp. p − ) of the positive (resp. negative) biases for A ⊕ B over randomly chosen u 1 and the percentage q of the positive biases for A ⊕ B over randomly chosen u 1 . Similarly, we also compute the average of the positive p ′ + (resp. negative p ′ − ) biases for C over randomly chosen u 1 and the percentage q ′ of the positive biases.
The distribution of the bias for A ⊕ B over u 1 is independent of the distribution of the bias for C over u 1 , so we combine the results and give an estimate on the bias of A ⊕ B ⊕ C by
Improved Attacks on CubeHash
Using our synthetic analysis, we analyzed all the 11 rounds for CubeHash. We give our results in Table 1 . Note that we can show that all the linear approximations for Round 5 are independent and for Round 6, so no bias improvement is possible for Round 5 as well as Round 6. Due to the dependence within each round, we are able to improve the bias estimate for 11-round CubeHash from 2 −234 in [1] to 2 −207.1 . This gives an improved attack for 11-round CubeHash with complexity 2 414.2 . We can extend our above results to attack 12-round CubeHash. Our analysis shows that by choosing the same output masks from the set {0x600, 0x18000, 0x180000, 0xc000000, 0xc0000000} for x 01101 and x 01111 at the end of Round 5, going backwards 6 rounds, forwards 6 rounds, we get 5 five new linear approximations (given in Appendix A) on 12-round CubeHash. They all have the same bias of around 2 −261.1 . In particular, with this construction, the last 11 rounds all have the same bias as our 11-round CubeHash above. The bias for its first round is 2 −54 , assuming all linear approximations are independent 6 .
In above analysis, the analysis is focused within each round. According to the specification of CubeHash, no randomization is introduced between consecutive rounds, and the biases of consecutive rounds of CubeHash are likely to be dependent. Our current quick results show that the bias for round 6 and round 7 can be improved to 2 −6 , and the bias for round 4 and round 5 can be improved to 2 −16 . Thus, we have the improved bias estimate 2 −259.1 for 12-round CubeHash. By using the five equal biases, we have an attack complexity 2 (−256.5)×(−2) , ie. O(2 513 ). was estimated to be 2 −70.5 in [5] . It yields the best distinguishing attack with complexity 2 141 , which is still above the claimed security level 2 128 .
Our Improved Analysis on Stream Cipher Rabbit
In this section, we apply our synthetic approach to analyze the main part of the bias analysis, i.e., the total combined bias of the six linear approximations below for m = 0x606, m ′ = 0x6060000 (for simplicity we omit the irrelevant subscripts i from the variables g):
Let Group One contain (32), (33), (36) and Group Two contain (34), (37). Following Sect. 3, we can demonstrate that the linear approximations in Group One are independent from those in Group Two. Nonetheless, given (35), the two groups are not independent. We let A denote the corresponding 7 Boolean function of (35), and let B, C denote the corresponding 8 Boolean function for Group One, Group Two respectively. Obviously, this is a conditional dependent bias problem as we proposed in Sect. 4. Using our first solution in Sect. 4, we compute the bias for A ⊕ B, C respectively and get 2 −11.4 , 2 −6 . We estimate the combined bias for above six linear approximations by
Now, we want to apply our black-box solution (31) in Sect. 4. In our case, we have
. For A ⊕ B, we compute with 2 26 random samples for each randomly chosen u 1 and we run it 2 14 times. We get in hexadecimal form: q = 0x24a6/0x4000, p + = 0x1e0e6f c1/(0x24a6 * 2 25 ), p − = 0x123210ab/(0x1b5a * 2 25 ). They correspond to the percentage of positive bias 57.3%, the average of positive bias +2 −9.3 , the average of negative bias −2 −9.6 , and the average bias +2 −11.43 of all. For the function C, we compute with 2 22 random samples for each randomly chosen u 1 and we run it 2 16 times. We get q ′ = 0xaf ed/0x10000, p ′ + = 0xd4698c87/(0xaf ed * 2 21 ), p ′ − = 0x4ea00ceb/(0x5013 * 2 21 ). They correspond to the percentage of positive bias 68.7%, the average of positive bias +2 −4.73 , the average of negative bias −2 −5.03 , and the average bias +2 −5.94 of all 9 . By (31), we estimate the bias 2 −17.5 for A ⊕ B ⊕ C. This result agrees with our first estimation (38). Note that based on the naive independence assumption, this combined bias is estimated to be smaller, i.e., 2 −20 , according to [5] . Consequently, we have an improved attack on Rabbit with complexity 2 136 , based on [5] .
Conclusion
In this paper, we take a first step towards the synthetic approach on bias analysis. We apply the "Divide-and-Conquer" method to our synthetic bias analysis. Our synthetic approach helps make the task of bias analysis easier when multiple Boolean functions are involved. We also propose a conditional dependent bias problem. Based on naive heuristics and certain ideal assumptions, we give the synthetic bias analysis to estimate the bias. Our synthetic approach is successfully applied to improve the best linear attacks [1, 5] on CubeHash and Rabbit respectively. We present an improved attack on 11-round CubeHash with complexity 2 414.2 . Based on our 11-round attack, we give a new linear attack for 12-round CubeHash with complexity 2 513 , which is sharply close to the security parameter 2 512 of CubeHash. We also give an improved attack on Rabbit with complexity 2 136 . Moreover, it seems that our results might be further improved, from our ongoing computations.
